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Regulating Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs)
Summary
Research led by the University of Pennsylvania Professor David Hoffman presents legal literature’s first
detailed analysis of the inner workings of Initial Coin Offerings (ICO). Startups are using the novel funding
mechanism with increasing frequency. In 2017, an estimate 370 ICOs raised around $6.2 billion, and by July
2018, an additional 430 ICOs had raised almost $17.2 billion. ICOs come with the promise of a “smart
contract”, or an automated contract that governs real world relationships where before a legal document would
have been employed. Human oversight is supposed to be unnecessary because the embedded code ensures
proper governance. But do ICOs actually deliver what they promise? Hoffman’s team examines the white
papers of the 50 top grossing ICOs from 2017 and compares the promises made to the underlying code. ICO
investors face a unique set of concerns, three of which are addressed in detail: will promotors restrict the
supply of their cyryptoasset, will they restrict the transfer of cryptoassets according to a vesting or lock-up
plan, and do promotors retain the power to modify the smart-contract code governing the tokens sold? The
findings are stark: ICO software code and ICO investor disclosures often did not match. While ICOs are a
potentially powerful financial innovation, this failure of self-governance reveals opportunities for
policymakers consider options to protect consumers and help the ICO market mature.
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Regulating Initial Coin Offerings 
(ICOs)
David Hoffman, Professor of Law
In 2017, Bitcoin vaulted from the fringes of popular media to become one of the 
ubiquitous financial stories of the year. The price of a single bitcoin hit nearly 
$20,000—up from a nickel in 2010—as widespread demand for cryptocurrencies 
(and information about them) skyrocketed.1 
With this rise in price and interest, the technology 
underlying Bitcoin has evolved significantly, enabling 
a range of new projects with more advanced features. 
This innovation has led to the explosion of another 
“crypto” phenomenon that has received comparatively 
much less mainstream attention than the Bitcoin 
craze: the ICO, or Initial Coin Offering.  It is 
important that policymakers understand that 2017 was 
not just the year of Bitcoin; it was also the beginning 
of an ICO tidal wave. 
The largely unregulated process known as an ICO 
allows a start-up, or even an established corporation, to 
mint2 and sell its own digital “token” to raise funds—
either in the form of cash or another cryptocurrency 
like Bitcoin, Ethereum, or Ripple—thus bypassing 
traditional capital markets and avenues for venture 
financing. But unlike its namesake, the IPO, an 
ICO does not typically involve the sale of equity in 
(or governance rights pertaining to) a corporation. 
Instead, ICO participants buy an asset—a token—
that enables its holder to use or govern a network 
that the promoters plan to develop with the funds 
raised through the sale.3  It would be as if Coca-Cola 
SUMMARY
• Initial Coin Offerings (the process for raising funds for a 
business venture through the establishment and sale of a new 
cryptocurrency) are attracting a great deal of interest—in 2017 
alone, an estimated 370 ICOs raised around $6.2 billion—but 
they are not well understood.
• ICO transactions are based on “smart contracts”: automated 
rules, designed by programmers, to govern the functionality 
of the digital cryptoassets sold in ICOs. In theory, transactions 
based on smart contracts do not require human oversight, as 
the computer code embedded in the contracts is supposed to 
ensure proper governance.
• But an analysis of the 50 ICOs that raised the most capital in 
2017 reveals a troubling trend: for many ICOs, the software 
code does not deliver what the ICO promises in its investor 
disclosure documents. ICO code often fails to ensure key investor 
protections, and sometimes provides founders with significant, 
undisclosed authority to alter investor rights.
• Currently, there is no ICO regulatory regime comparable to 
what the SEC and state securities regulators provide for IPOs. 
Policymakers would do well to develop a regulatory environment 
that can help the ICO market mature, particularly in the accurate 
encoding of smart contracts. But they first will need to understand 
who is on the buy side of ICO transactions —and whether they 
warrant protection. 
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had funded its initial deployment of 
vending machines through the sale 
of tokens its machines might one day 
require. For ICOs, however, the tokens 
and the “machines” they operate are 
digital. They exist on the Internet, 
embodied in software code. 
ICOs expand the role played 
by computer code in governing 
transactional relationships. Laws, 
regulations, contracts, and commercial 
norms heavily mediate traditional 
capital market transactions. ICO 
transactions promise to augment, and 
perhaps replace, those intermediaries 
by embedding controls within “smart 
contracts.” These smart contracts—
automated, “if-this-then-that” rules 
that programmers can design to 
govern the functionality of the digital 
cryptoassets sold in ICOs—are the 
key forms of software driving this 
innovation.4 Smart contracts may 
be digital and automated, but they 
structure real-world relationships. 
ICOs are therefore both a financial 
innovation and a technological 
one, where promoters attempt to 
effectuate their promises to investors 
through computer code, rather than 
by traditional contract. At the same 
time, the smart contracts on which 
ICOs are built may be a regulatory 
innovation: human oversight of 
these transactions is supposed to be 
unnecessary because the embedded 
computer code ensures proper 
governance.
That ICOs are a potentially 
powerful financial tool is undeniable. 
Already they have enabled a widened 
range of potential investors to support 
the development of new, software-
based enterprises.5  In 2017, an 
estimated 370 ICOs raised around 
$6.2 billion.6  By July of 2018, an 
additional 430 ICOs had raised 
almost $17.2 billion.7  At the same 
time, though, ICOs are ripe for fraud 
and exploitation. Government-led 
ICO investigations at both the federal 
and state levels have resulted in 
criminal charges for fraudulent and 
unregistered sales.8 
Given the amount of capital in 
play, and the clear existence of at 
least some bad actors in the ICO 
marketplace, legislators and regulators 
would be right to question the quality 
of ICOs. Do ICOs actually deliver 
what they promise? Answering that 
question carries significant policy 
implications, and requires that we take 
a closer look at the smart contracts 
that make ICOs possible.9 
In the first detailed analysis of 
the inner workings of ICOs, we 
surveyed the 50 ICOs that raised the 
most capital in 2017.  Simply put, 
ICO software code and ICO investor 
  1 See, e.g., Google Trends, using search terms such as 
“Bitcoin” and “Cryptocurrency.”
  2 Minting is the process of creating new cryptoassets (i.e., 
tokens or coins). Often, the new coins created for an ICO 
are minted using the system established by Ethereum, 
using that community’s coding standards (specifically 
“ERC-20”). 
  3 While an ICO can occur after a network has been built, the 
core practice is to raise funds pre-development. 
  4 Smart contracts were first introduced by Nick Szabo, who 
drew inspiration from the “humble vending machine,” 
in “Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public 
Networks,” FIRST MONDAY, Sept. 1997. Today, smart 
contracts exist on the Ethereum blockchain. Some are 
written in a complex, hard-to-read coding language known 
as byte code.
  5 Nathaniel Popper, “Dealbook: Easiest Path of Riches on the 
Web? An Initial Coin Offering,” The New York Times (June 
23, 2017).
  6 We have observed a number of instances where reports of 
market capitalization greatly exceed what we have been 
able to identify on blockchain explorers like etherscan.
io. Solely to ease exposition, we use market values (in US 
dollars) reported by widely used coin data sites.
  7 All data is from Coinschedule.com. 
 8 For background on federal and state investigations 
o f  ICOs , see  h t tp : / / fo r tune .com/2017/12/04/
cryptocurrency-bitcoin-sec-ico-scam/ and https://
www.clearyfintechupdate.com/2018/03/around-world-
icos-icos-united-states/ (discussing SEC enforcement); 
and http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/734604/
fin+tech/Update+Cryptocurrency+Cybercrimes+And+ICO
+Enforcement+Actions (highlighting NASAA and Colorado 
NOTES
FIGURE 1  ICO CAPITAL RAISED IN 2017 (BY MONTH)
 Coinschedule.com/stats estimates that 371ICOs raised over $6.24 billion in 2017.
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disclosures often do not match. In 
a financial ecosystem built around 
the proposition that regulation is 
unnecessary because code is the final 
guarantee of performance, the absence 
of coded governance protections is 
troubling. We further discovered 
that at least some popular ICOs 
not only have retained the power to 
modify their tokens’ rights, but also 
have failed to disclose that ability in 
plain English. In this Issue Brief, I 
summarize the results of the research I 
conducted with several colleagues and 
offer some specific considerations for 
the future gatekeepers and regulators 
that this space needs.10
THE THREE PROMISES OF 
COIN PROMOTERS
In the traditional IPO context, the 
SEC and state securities regulators 
oversee issuer activity from soup to 
nuts. As of 2017, no similarly clear 
regime was in place for ICOs. In 
lieu of the heavily lawyered products 
of IPO documentation, the ICO 
market coalesced on an informal 
document known as a “white paper.”11 
Cryptoasset white papers are public 
documents, hosted on issuers’ websites, 
which describe promoters’ plans for 
development and solicit community 
involvement. The legal status of such 
documents is unclear.
We analyzed the relationship 
between the “paper” promises made 
by ICO promoters in their offering 
documents and white papers, and 
the actual functionality of the digital 
assets they deliver. We established 
actual functionality by examining the 
smart contracts associated with each 
ICO, along with the broader software 
environments (i.e., “distributed 
ledgers” or “blockchains”12) through 
which those smart contracts function. 
The fifty firms we studied raised a 
total of $2.6 billion in revenue at their 
ICOs, and the notional initial market 
cap was $3.8 billion. The business 
sectors in the sample varied, with 
most being located in infrastructure 
(14), trading (8), payments (7), and 
other aspects of finance (5).13  In the 
sample, 12 (25%) were headquartered 
in the United States, 9 (19%) in 
Switzerland, and the remaining 
in variety of countries, including 
Singapore (5), England (2), Russia (2), 
Estonia (2), and Thailand (2). By May 
of 2018, six of the projects had not 
released any kind of alpha version or 
demo of their project.
We evaluated our sample on 
three aspects of governance that 
ICO proponents have claimed can be 
delivered through code, and which 
economic theory suggests should be 
salient to ICO investors. Without 
spending a large sum of money 
purchasing the time and know-how 
of a very motivated and talented 
reverse engineer, an investor would be 
restricted to relying on these promises 
as articulated in promoters’ white 
papers and sales documents.
• First, did ICO promoters make 
any promises to restrict the supply 
of their cryptoassets? Were these 
promises enforced using smart 
contracts? A purchaser’s protection 
against wanton inflation of supply 
comes directly from the cryptoasset 
code. Maximum supply of a 
cryptoasset can be specified and 
enforced (or not) via the code 
comprising the cryptoasset itself. 
Supply caps are a typical part of an 
ICO’s marketing materials, although 
some cryptoassets lack this feature.14 
• Second, did ICO promoters pledge 
to restrict the transfer of any 
cryptoassets allocated to insiders 
according to a vesting or lock-up 
plan?15  Were these pledges built 
into smart contracts? A vast 
majority of promoters in our sample 
made vesting promises in their sales 
State enforcement actions). 
 9 See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, “Trust but Verify: Why Blockchain 
Needs Law,” 32 Berkeley J.L. & Tech. (forthcoming 2018). 
10 Issue Brief is based on Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, 
Jeremy Sklaroff & David Wishnick, “Coin-Operated 
Capitalism”, 119 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
 11 Iris M. Barsan, “Legal Challenges of Initial Coin Offerings,” 
3 Revue Trimestrielle Du Droit Financier 54 (2017). 
 12 Blockchains are the publicly or privately distributed ledgers 
for cryptocurrencies.
13 All sectors in the top 50: commerce & advertising, 
data storage, energy & utilities, finance, gambling & 
betting, gaming & VR, health care, identity & reputation, 
infrastructure, legal, social media, trading & investing, and 
payments. We use the sectors provided by Coinschedule.
com. 
14 For example, there is no cap on the amount of ether that 
can be created. Indeed there is heated debate about 
whether this is a desirable feature of Ethereum or not.
15 The story of a project called Matchpool demonstrates 
how the absence of coded vesting rules can result in 
mischief. Within days of a reported $5.7 million ICO, one 
founder departed from the project and wrote that his 
cofounder, the CEO, had withdrawn 37,500 ether from 
the wallet without explanation. See Nick Tomaino, Tweet 
(Apr. 5, 2017, 3:46 PM): https://twitter.com/NTmoney/
status/849755116156600321.
16 Three remained in byte code, which we did not have the 
capacity to read, and one, FileCoin, which raised the most 
money in the sample ($257 million), has not released any 
code or token.
17 Jonathan Rohr and Aaron Wright, “Blockchain-Based 
Token Sales and the Democratization of Public Capital 
NOTES 
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documents. Most vesting schemes 
are time-based but provide few of 
the other contractual conditions that 
accompany traditional stock vesting. 
Examining how vesting promises are 
enforced using smart contracts–if at 
all–sheds light on whether investors 
should be confident that a project’s 
key people will not run off with 
their newly-raised capital.
• Third, did ICO promoters retain the 
power to modify the smart-contract 
code governing the tokens they 
sold, and if so, did they disclose that 
they had allocated themselves that 
power? Because cryptoassets are 
defined by smart contracts, whether 
those smart contracts are modifiable 
should profoundly impact price and 
receive intense investor scrutiny. 
But our data suggests investors 
pay little attention to even simple 
non-technical markers of quality; 
it’s thus incredibly unlikely that they 
have the technical skills to monitor 
a development team’s use  
of modification.
An ICO that promises particular 
governance terms but does not 
encode them is not delivering on an 
archetypal feature of this financial 
form. According to those who argue 
the ICO is novel—so novel as to deny 
the need for wise intermediaries, VC 
vetting, and regulators with teeth—it 
is the immutable, transparent code 
that enables (and creates) a trustless 
but trusted market. Yet thus far, there 
remain good reasons not to take 
promoters at their word. 
THE RESULTS: PROMISES 
UNFULFILLED
These are the results of our analysis, 
which compares promises made to 
investors with cryptoasset software 
and code. For each listed promotion, 
we scrutinized the white papers, token 
sale agreements, and computer code 
posted by the promoters:
• Of the 50 tokens, we audited the 
code of 46.16
• Overall, only about 2 in 3 firms 
that we audited (31 of 46) encoded 
a supply restriction, even though 
about 90 percent (41 of 46) 
promised it.
• Only 37 of the 46 auditable issuers 
promised vesting in their marketing 
documents or white papers. Of 
those that promised to vest, the vast 
majority (29 of 37) apparently did 
not use smart contracts to encode 
those rights.
• Modification is rarely discussed 
in marketing materials: only 7 of 
the 50 firms discussed the token’s 
modifiability in their marketing 
materials or soft contracts. But 
overall, 10 of the 50 firms permit 
modification through their code, 
60 percent of which (6 of 10) did 
not discuss modification but still 
encoded it.
To sum up: there are significant 
differences between code and 
contract in our sample. These results 
demonstrate that ICO code often fails 
to deliver key investor protections, 
and sometimes provides founders 
with significant, undisclosed authority 
to alter investor rights. While 
ICOs are promoted by an industrial 
community that espouses techno-
libertarian beliefs in the power of the 
“trustless trust” and carefully designed 
code, actual ICO practices do not 
uphold that ideology. Promoters are 
making governance claims modeled 
on traditional equity-based rules 
intended to reduce agency costs, but 
they are not encoding those promises 
into the decentralized systems 
undergirding their projects’ purported 
sky-high values. 
Markets,” 97 Cardozo Leg. Stud. Res. Paper No. 527 
(2018) (suggesting that failure to list code in an open 
source site “may signal ulterior motives on the part of the 
party selling the token”). 
18 This has been the approach taken, for instance, by 
regulators in China and South Korea. 
19 Max Raskin, “The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts,” 1 
Georgetown Law & Tech. Rev. 304 (2017) (arguing for a 
light hand on smart contract regulation). 
20 Jordan Pearson, “The Russians Who Allegedly Hacked the 
DNC Mined Bitcoin to Fund their Operation,” Motherboard 
(July 13, 2018). 
21 Sean Foley, Jonathan R. Karlsen, & Talis J. Putnins, “Sex 
Drugs, and Bitcoin: How Much Illegal Activity is Financed 
Through Cryptocurrencies?” (unpublished manuscript).
22 Jongsub Lee, Tao Li, & Donghwa Shin, “The Wisdom of 
Crowds and Information Cascades in FinTech: Evidence 
From Initial Coin Offers,” (unpublished manuscript) (June 
2018).
23 Christian Masiak, Joern H. Block, Tobias Masiak, Matthias 
Neuenkirch, and Katja N. Pielen, “The Market Cycles of 
ICOs, Bitcoin, and Ether,” (unpublished manuscript).
24 See, e.g., Olga Kharif & Camila Russo, “Venture Capital 
Surges Into Crypto Startups,” Bloomberg (Mar. 26, 2018). 
25 On the contrary, economic theorists have recently begun 
developing models that show the potential for cryptoassets 
to unlock information and value for investors during the 
early stages of an entrepreneurial venture. See note 21 in 
my paper for more. 
26 The obvious allusion is to ordinary contractual fine print. 
See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, and David 
R. Trossen, “Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer 
Attention to Standard Form Contracts,” 43 J. Legal Stud. 1 
NOTES 
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WHO IS BUYING?
If investors know about the problems 
we have identified, then the makeup 
of the top 50 ICOs suggests that they 
don’t much care. We would expect to 
see (all else equal) higher capital raises 
by teams that faithfully coded supply 
and vesting protections, and also 
disclosed their modification powers. 
But we find no evidence of that effect 
in our sample. It is also worth noting 
that ICOs, like stocks, have developed 
a wide range of secondary information 
sources, including “ratings” websites. 
But most of these raters do not vet 
smart contract code, and there is 
essentially no emphasis on checking 
that coded governance actually 
happens.17
So how should regulators, 
legislators, and scholars think about 
these problems? Some see evidence of 
fraud and call for the whole market 
to be shut down.18  Others would 
like the state to keep out.19  For the 
pragmatists out there, the answer 
depends a lot on who is investing in 
ICOs, and why.
We see four archetypal 
participants on the buy-side in the 
ICO market. Each has different 
implications for how to interpret the 
sell-side picture we have painted in 
this Issue Brief. Gaining a better read 
on the precise ratios and combinations 
of each will be a key next step for 
policymakers who deal with ICOs. 
1. BUBBLE SPECULATORS:
A lot of people have jumped 
headlong into cryptocurrencies. A 
bubble would be the least surprising 
and most manageable version of the 
ICO market we are living through. 
Regulators would simply need to 
focus on popping the bubble with 
better informational requirements. 
2. CRIMINALS:
Many signs suggest that a material 
portion of cryptoasset demand is 
driven by money-launderers, tax 
evaders, and other holders of illicit 
cash. Recently, this has been made 
salient by allegations that Russian 
hacking of the Democratic National 
Committee in 2016 was bought and 
paid for using Bitcoin.20  Indeed, one 
recent paper found that approximately 
half of all Bitcoin transactions were 
associated with some form of illegal 
activity.21 Another found that the 
imposition of “Know Your Customer” 
policies designed to enforce tax and 
anti-money laundering laws shrank 
ICO returns.22 
3. CRYPTO GAMBLERS:
ICOs might serve as a decent 
place for “Bitcoin millionaires”—
investors who raked in large gains 
on early investments in Bitcoin and 
Ethereum—to park and diversify 
winnings that are trapped in crypto 
purgatory. Or, investors could just be 
gambling with house money. There 
is preliminary evidence supporting 
this idea. Specifically, one time-series 
analysis suggests that blockbuster 
ICOs have negative effects on Bitcoin 
and Ether prices.23
4. SMART MONEY:
Anecdotal reports indicate that a 
wide range of old-growth VC firms, 
hedge funds, and family offices are, 
in fact, investing in ICOs.24 Are 
“smart money” investors doing the 
heavy analytical lifting in the ICO 
market? It is hard to say. If that were 
the case, we would expect to see 
greater price sensitivity to promoters’ 
broken promises. Smart money 
investors would have the best access to 
sophisticated technical tools used to 
monitor what ICO teams are actually 
doing with their software code—and 
whether they are making good on 
promises in their sales documents.
Based on the strong evidence 
that smart money is not leading 
(2014) (finding vanishingly low reading rates for traditional 
contracts). 
27 The SEC, with its newly developed “Cyber Unit,” is 
increasingly active in patrolling the scene. Other 
regulators, along with courts, will also contribute to 
increasing formalization of ICO code standards. See Press 
Release, SEC, SEC Announces Enforcement Initiatives to 
Combat Cyber-Based Threats and Protect Retail Investors 
(Sept. 25, 2017), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/
press-release/2017-176.
NOTES 
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this market, it can be tempting to 
cast doubt on all aspects of ICOs, 
including smart contracts. Though 
it will take future research to prove 
it, the ICO buy side today looks like 
a mixture of a bubble and an illicit 
market, with some smart money 
riding its coattails. 
TAKEAWAYS FOR 
POLICYMAKERS
ICOs are not inherently a scam, and 
smart contract code has enormous 
promise as a regulatory innovation.25 
But their promise and their present 
form are miles apart.  Policymakers 
might do well to look beyond 
the bubble (and its certain fate) 
and help the ICO market mature 
beyond this first experiment in 
blockchain governance. Here is what 
policymakers should take away from 
our findings:
Before all else, unmask the buyers. 
Optimal regulation depends heavily 
on a better understanding of the buy 
side of the market. Policymakers need 
to know whether a substantial fraction 
of market activity raises genuine 
consumer protection concerns, or 
if the market is driven by money 
laundering and or other illicit activity 
instead. While the bursting of the 
ICO bubble would certainly provide 
some insight, proactive investigations 
could be more enlightening. 
Policymakers should consider building 
out regulatory capacity to police this 
market.
THE BIGGEST FLAW WITH 
ICOS: NO ONE READS SMART 
CONTRACTS
Code has the potential to be a 
substitute and complement for 
legalistic governance mechanisms 
in financial contracting, but smart 
contracts are extremely difficult to 
read and, in practice, no one actually 
reads them.26 The community of 
people who are able to vet and audit 
smart contracts has much room 
to grow. As it does grow, and as 
existing institutions develop vetting 
capacity, we would expect to see 
quality improve. Smart contract code 
was supposed to render traditional 
intermediaries useless, obviate the 
need for regulation, and reduce 
transactions costs for participants. 
Without those justifications—or 
without a move in the direction of 
regulation—it is difficult to see ICOs 
as anything other than regulatory 
arbitrage. 
INVESTORS AND HONEST 
COIN PROMOTERS WANT 
INTERMEDIARIES
Some firms are encoding their 
promises, though it’s not obviously 
rewarding to do so. Others are 
working to create intermediaries 
and certification regimes despite 
the contrary incentives present in 
a sharply rising market. Although 
our research shows that computer 
code is not presently a reliable part 
of the ICO form, it also strongly 
suggests that an increased presence of 
gatekeepers and regulators might help 
that process along. The rise of trusted 
intermediaries appears to be the next 
necessary step in the maturation of 
the ICO market.27 
REWARDING GOOD ACTORS 
SHOULD BE AS IMPORTANT 
AS PUNISHING FRAUDSTERS 
On the one hand, creating new coins 
and selling them through an ICO is 
a project that is ripe for fraud and 
should be policed. On the other hand, 
smart contracts and blockchains 
may end up being as revolutionary 
as their proponents suggest, so it is 
important to support a regulatory 
environment that rewards honest 
actors for accurately encoding 
promises made to investors, without 
creating new barriers to entry that 
protect first-movers. For these efforts 
to be successful, it is imperative for 
policymakers to understand the 
contours of ICO transactions, and the 
institutional environment in which 
they take place, in detail. 
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